A Bellicose Acceptance

©2003 by Dale Franks

Iraq may have grudgingly agreed to allow UN inspectors into Iraq, but it's too early for a big sigh of relief. The Iraqi acceptance, contained in a 9-page, bellicose screed against the United States, has some troubling points.

According to the UN's timeline for Iraq, Iraq must provide by December 8th a full and complete declaration of its inventory of weapons of mass destruction, along with a complete declaration of all aspects of nuclear, chemical, and biological programs. UN Weapons inspectors are then supposed to inform the UN Security Council of any false statements or omissions in the declaration.

The text of the Iraqi letter accepting the inspectors may have already given us a preview of this declaration. According to the Iraqi letter, "Iraq has not developed weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical, or biological, as claimed by evil people." Indeed, the mere suggestion that Iraq may be developing WMD has, according to the Iraqi Government, been "fabricated by the President of the United States administration, in the biggest and most wicked slander against Iraq, supported in malicious intent, and spearheaded in word and malevolence, by his lackey Tony Blair…They both know, as well as we do, and so can other countries, that such fabrications are baseless."

If that's the Iraqi position, then one suspects that their declaration will be nothing more than a complete denial of the existence of such weapons. Yet we appear to have mountains of intelligence data that shows the Iraqi position to be completely false. Either our intelligence apparatus and that of the UK has completely broken down, or the Iraqis are simply lying about the extent to which they have pursued nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In that case, it will be up to the inspectors to find the evidence that disproves the Iraqi declarations. That shouldn't be too hard, if our intelligence on Iraq is correct.

Of course, to find that evidence, the Iraqis will have to allow the inspectors to do their jobs. The text of the Iraqi letter, however, suggests that they might not actually allow the inspectors to have the free reign they're supposed to have.

We hereby inform you that we will deal with resolution 1441, despite its bad contents, if it is to be implemented according to the premeditated evil of the parties of ill-intent, the important thing in this is trying to spare our people from harm. But we will not forget, nor should others do, that safeguarding our people's dignity, security, independence and protecting our sovereignty and sublime values, is as a sacred duty in our leadership's and government's agenda…. Dealing with the inspectors, the government of Iraq will, also, take into consideration, their way of conduct, the intentions of those who are ill-intentioned amongst them and their improper approach in showing respect to the people's national dignity, their independence and security, and their country's security, independence and sovereignty.

This is not a promise of full cooperation, and leaves unanswered what the response will be if, in the Iraqi government's view, the inspectors' conduct demonstrates an "improper approach" or "ill-intent". In the past, the Iraqis have barred the inspectors from going to some sites on the grounds that doing so would be a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. This sounds to me suspiciously like a hint that further obstructions of this type may be in the offing.

The Iraqi government has proven itself to be completely and blatantly untrustworthy. Indeed, some of the stories the inspectors tell about Iraqi excuses have been so blatantly untruthful that they would be humorous, were the situation not so deadly serious. Iraq's entire history of dealing with the UNSCOM weapons inspectors has been one of deceit, delay, resistance, and obfuscation.

So far, it's a strategy that has worked for them. It led to the withdrawal of inspectors in 1998, giving them four years to research WMD technology without any hindrance from the international community, and in violation of their solemn pledge. It would not, therefore, be surprising to see them test such a strategy again.

No doubt the Iraqis have noticed that French and Russian pressure resulted in a UN resolution that requires more Security Council deliberation if Iraq refuses to cooperate fully, rather than a resolution that automatically authorizes force in the face of non-compliance. They must also certainly be aware that both France and Russia have expressed the deepest reservations about any attack on Iraq. It is not unreasonable, therefore, for the Iraqis to suspect that the Security Council will allow them to get away with a fair amount of resistance to the inspectors just as they have for much of the past decade.

For the Iraqis to make such an estimation is, I think, to discount the readiness of the Bush Administration for a regime-change in Iraq. The president has tried to make it clear that there is no excuse for any deceit or evasion by the Iraqi government, and by all accounts, the Bush Administration is ready to drop the hammer on Saddam Hussein. It is not clear, however, whether the Iraqi government realizes that.

With that in mind, if the Iraqis produce a blanket denial of WMD programs or research on December 8th, the question of what the Bush Administration's response will be becomes quite an interesting one, indeed.

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